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THE CHALLENGE TO FINANCIAL REGULATORS
POSED BY SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION*
Roberta S. Karmelt
INTRODUCTION
The idea of private investment accounts, as an alternative
or supplement to Social Security is rapidly taking hold of the
political imagination.' There is a significant variation, howev-
er, in the ideas for Social Security privatization. Some propos-
als would raise the payroll tax and then let the Social Security
trust fund invest in pools of common stocks instead of govern-
"© 1998 Roberta S. Karmel. All Rights Reserved.
t Roberta S. Karmel is a Professor and Co-Director of the Center for the
Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School and of Counsel to
the law firm of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP. She is a former Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. A research stipend from Brooklyn Law
School was of assistance in the preparation of this Article. The assistance of
Brooklyn Law School student Sheldon Mui is gratefully acknowledged.
' A Federal Advisory Panel on Social Security, appointed in 1994 and headed
by Edward M. Gramlich, issued a report in January 1997 that reflected the
Panel's inability to agree on one single plan for dealing with Social Security's
financial difficulties. However, 7 of 13 members recommended compulsory private
saving through individual investment accounts. See Robert Pear, Panel on Social
Security Urges Investing in Stocks, But Is Split Over Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1997, at Al; see also Jackie Calmes, Social Security Report Opens Debate, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 7, 1997, at A2. The initial White House response was that any plan
to put Social Security funds in the stock market raises concerns about risk, no
matter whether the government or individuals decide where funds should be in-
vested. Jackie Calmes, Clinton Panel Cites 'Risk" in Putting Social Security Funds
in Stock Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1997 at A2. A subsequent Federal Advisory
Committee, headed by Donald Marron, unanimously recommended that Social Se-
curity be supplemented by individual investment accounts. See Richard W.
Stevenson, Bipartisan Plan for Rescue of Social Security Involves Markets and
Retirement at 70, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A17; see also Judd Gregg et al., A
Look at ... The Future of Social Security, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at C3. This
idea began to have liberal as well as conservative backing. See, e.g., Gerald F.
Seib, Moving Beyond Simply "Saving" Social Security, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1998,
at A24. Then, President Clinton voiced interest in investing some of the Social
Security trust fund in the stock market. See Christina Duff, Clinton Willing to
Consider Investing Some Social Security Funds in Stocks, WALL ST. J., July 28,
1998, at A4.
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ment bonds as the fund does currently.2 An alternative would
change the present Social Security defined benefit system to a
defined contribution system.' The most free market version of
this idea would permit persons to invest as they choose, al-
though perhaps only through certified financial institutions.4
Others contemplate that the private investment accounts
would be allocated by the Social Security Administration into a
menu of from five to ten broad market index funds, covering
both stocks and bonds.5 Under any of these ideas, there are
further questions about whether, upon reaching retirement
age, accumulated funds should be distributed, or converted to
annuities.6
In addition to the possibility of Social Security privatiza-
tion, there is a growing preference by both employers and
employees for defined contribution pension plans rather than
defined benefit pension plans in the private sector.7 These
trends are not only ongoing in the United States but also
worldwide.8 Accordingly, an increasing number of individuals
will be obliged to take responsibility for the investment of their
pension funds, and more of these funds are likely to be chan-
neled into stock markets as opposed to government debt. While
governments may decide to control individual investment deci-
2 EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, Is IT TIME TO REFORM SOCIAL SECURITY? 58 (1998).
In my view, this is not true privatization, especially if the funds are simply in-
vested in index funds. On the other hand, it can be argued that allowing the
government selectively to invest the trust fund in the private capital markets
would amount to socialization of the economy. See Krzysztof M. Ostaszewski, Pri-
vatizing the Social Security Trust Fund? Don't Let the Government Invest, 6 SOC.
SECURITY PRIVATIZATION, Jan. 14, 1997, at 1.
3 GRAMLICH, supra note 2, at 60.
GRAMLICH, supra note 2, at 62.
GRAMLICH, supra note 2, at 64.
6 GRAMLICH, supra note 2, at 62.
See Janice Koch, Performance Anxieties, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1,
1998, at 89, 90; see also SEC STAFF REPORT, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF-CEN-
TURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
No. 1504, at 136-44 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS].
" See GROUP OF TEN, THE MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF
AGING POPULATIONS 25-29 (1998); see also Joel Millman & Craig Torres, Mexico to
Allow 12 Companies to Offer Pension-Fund Services, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1997, at
A7; Peter Passell, How Chile Farms Out Nest Eggs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at
D1; Ellen E. Schultz, Going, Going ... Global: 401(k) Plans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26,
1996, at Cl; Craig R. Whitney, In Europe, Too, Social Security Isn't So Secure,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, § 4, at 4; Japan's Debt-Ridden Future, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 3, 1996, at 31.
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sion-making under a Social Security privatization plan to a
greater or lesser extent, the possible implications for securities
regulatory regimes are significant.
At a time when stock markets are at all time highs, en-
couraging pension fund equity investments may seem like a
brilliant idea. After a serious stock market crash or a pro-
longed bear market, such investments may seem to have been
ill-advised.9 What should the responsibility of government be
for investor protection under a new regime in which more
retirement funds are subject to stock market risks as well as
rewards? Over the past few decades, securities regulation in
the United States has been relaxed in a number of areas.'0
Some of this deregulation is part of a general political trend;
some has been justified on the theory that stock markets have
become institutionalized, financial institutions do not necessar-
ily need the protection of the federal securities laws and a long
bull market has diminished the clamor for rigorous investor
protection. In other countries, securities regulation has re-
mained less rigorous than in the United States because such
countries do not have a long-standing culture of equity invest-
ment by individuals."
' In October 1987 the stock market declined 30% in less than one week. See
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, reprinted in
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special Report No. 1267, at 15 (Jan. 12, 1988). Also, the
markets for stock options and financial futures behaved as one market, id. at 55,
and the market break in the United States triggered similar breaks all around the
world. Id. at 9-14. Further, the psychological and economic effects of a bear mar-
ket can last a long time. See Bernard Wysocki, Jr., "Wealth Effect" Tends to Lin-
ger on for Years, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at Al. During the summer of 1998,
$4 trillion of the world's financial wealth was wiped out by stock declines. The
World Economy On the Edge, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 19. Further, this de-
cline had international effects. See Michael R. Sesit & Sara Webb, Wall Street
Takes the Globe on a Wild Ride, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1998, at Cl, C14. Critics of
privatizing Social Security point out that privatization subjects workers to invest-
ment risks. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided
Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131, 156 (1998). Others argue that, over time, returns
from equity investment exceed Social Security returns. See, e.g., Melissa Hieger &
William Shipman, Common Objections to a Market-Based Social Security System: A
Response, 10 SOC. SECURITY PRIVATIZATION, July 22, 1997, at 8-10; see also Robert
Pear, Panel in Discord On the Financing of Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1996, at 38.
'o See infra notes 61-63.
" See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Mar-
kets, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167, 169; Deborah Ball, New Entrepreneurs Fuel
IPO Bonanza in Italy, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1998, at B7.
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Generally, the securities industry has been supportive of
ideas to privatize Social Security and put more retirement sav-
ings into the public securities markets. 2 Others have favored
such a trend because they believe this would make for greater
efficiency in the allocation of capital throughout the economy
and would represent a retreat from a mixed economy to a pur-
er form of capitalism. 3 Little attention has been paid, howev-
er, to the possibility that such development could well lead to
more aggressive and far reaching regulation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and other financial regu-
lators, thus reversing the deregulatory trend of the past two
decades.
If the United States and other governments that have
provided economic safety nets for their older citizens reduce
such retirement protection or turn this task over to the private
sector, demands for other assurances of financial security may
be heard. Indeed, it would be irresponsible for government to
transfer its obligations to provide pensions to its citizens to the
private sector and then not assure that the funds to pay such
pensions will be forthcoming. Specifically, two different prob-
lems emerge-first, the problem of whether total investment
return will at least equal current payouts and second, the
solvency of any financial intermediaries holding pension funds.
This Article will outline some of the many possible reforms
likely to be considered or adopted by financial regulators to
accompany Social Security privatization. Such increased regu-
lation could be imposed directly, or indirectly, as conditions for
the investment of funds into the public equity securities mar-
kets, whether or not such investment is made by the Social
Security Administration, by individuals or by "certified" or
"approved" mutual funds.
Part I of this Article will outline some of the substantive
changes that might be made to ensure that equity investments
are not made in highly risky ventures. Such changes could
12 See, e.g., Broker-Dealer Duties, Preemption, CEA Reform Issues Confront Con-
gress, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 70 (Jan. 17, 1997); Jackie Calmes, Wall Street
Quietly Promotes Social Security Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1996, at A24.
"3 See Martin Feldstein, Privatizing Social Security, The $10 Trillion Opportu-
nity, 7 Soc. SECURITY PRIVATIZATION, Jan. 31, 1997, at 2-4; Mark Weinberger,
Social Security: Facing the Facts, 3 Soc. SECURITY PRIVATIZATION, Apr. 10, 1996,
at 8-9.
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include limitations on investment options involving a reconsid-
eration of the efficacy of merit regulation, the institution of
company registration and greater regulatory scrutiny of new
financial products. More stringent safety and soundness re-
quirements of financial intermediaries might also be put on
the table in order to guard against insolvencies and systematic
risk. In particular, increased investment adviser regulation
will be addressed.
Part II of this Article will discuss possible procedural or
jurisdictional changes in financial regulation that Social Secu-
rity privatization could prompt. Generally, more centralized
regulation is likely. This could involve continued preemption of
state securities laws, a continued shift to the federal govern-
ment of responsibility for bank regulation, the shift to the
federal government of regulation of insurance companies and
the consolidation of federal regulatory agencies. Although most
of this Article will focus on possible changes to financial regu-
lation in the United States that could accompany Social Securi-
ty privatization, Part III of this Article will discuss the impli-
cations for U.S. financial regulators of cross-border invest-
ments by private investment accounts.
Forecasting the future is uncertain. The ideas in this Arti-
cle are the Author's own views about the kind of regulatory
initiatives that are in accord with the long term "wish lists" of
the SEC and other regulators and that could be defended polit-
ically as appropriate to accompany Social Security privatiza-
tion. Whether any or all of them would ever be adopted de-
pends on a variety of political and economic factors beyond the
purview of this Author's crystal ball.
I. QUALITATIVE STANDARDS FOR SECURITIES INVESTMENTS AND
INTERMEDIARY RESTRICTIONS
A. Regulation of Issuers
1. Merit Regulation versus Full Disclosure
Before the first federal securities law, the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act"),'4 was enacted, there was considerable
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1998).
1998]
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debate about the extent to which the federal government
should control capital formation. One group advocated the full
disclosure view, suggested many years before by Louis D.
Brandeis: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.""5 Others
argued for more direct control of the sale of securities by the
federal government. Early drafts of federal legislation would
have prohibited any securities distribution by an issuer if the
business of the company or its securities were not sound or the
issuer was found to be dishonest or in unsound condition. 6
The Securities Act was a political compromise between critics
of bankers, corporate directors, and accountants who ques-
tioned the value of the private enterprise system and the busi-
ness community which strenuously objected to the control of
capital raising by a federal bureaucracy. Full disclosure, rather
than merit review, was selected as the regulatory model. 7
Nine months after the Securities Act was adopted, William
0. Douglas published a strong critique of the statute. In his
view, the Securities Act was a failure because it "presupposes
that the glaring light of publicity will give investors needed
protection" but investors "either lack the training or intelli-
gence to assimilate.., and find.., useful" the balance sheets,
contracts or other data in the registration statement "or are so
concerned with a speculative profit as to consider them irrele-
vant."8 According to Douglas, the reliance placed on truth
about securities was unrealistic because it ignored the modern
development of big business. Douglas espoused a regulatory
theory that was an integral part of a whole program of indus-
trial regulation and organization for a modern and complex
economy. Control over access to the capital markets "would be
an administrative control lodged not only in the banks of the
'
5 Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
18 See DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 43-52
(1980).
17 See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, I SECURITIES REGULATION 169-77 (3d ed.
1998).
18 William 0. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE L.J. 521, 523-24 (1934).
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new self-disciplined business groups but also in the hands of
government agencies whose function would be to articulate the
public interest with the profit motive." 9
A year after the Securities Act was passed, Congress
passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act"),2" creating the SEC and injecting some corporate gover-
nance standards into federal law. Short swing profits by offi-
cers, directors, and major stockholders in the securities of their
companies were prohibited.2 Federal control was imposed
over the proxy solicitations of large public companies.22 Of
great future importance, a catchall antifraud provision was
enacted, giving the SEC some rulemaking authority with re-
gard to fiduciary duties.' William 0. Douglas became a com-
missioner of the SEC in 1936, after serving on the SEC staff,
and served as Chairman of the SEC from September 1937 to
April 1939. The securities statutes, which he had a hand in
drafting, included controls on capital structure and corporate
governance. Specifically, the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 imposed various substantive controls upon the
capital structure of public utility holding companies. The Trust
Indenture Act of 193926 gave substantive protections to the
bondholder of public corporations and assured that their rights
would be protected by indenture trustees. The Investment
Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act")27 created a
corporate governance structure for mutual funds, and in partic-
ular, a requirement for control by independent directors." In
addition, the Investment Company Act regulated the capital
structure of mutual funds to assure against excessive lever-
age.29 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act")30
'9 Id. at 531.
2a 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1998).
2, See id. § 78p(b).
See id. § 78n.
2' See id. § 78j(b).
24 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 155-56 (1982).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1998).
26 Id. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1998).
" Id. §§ 80a-80a-64 (1998).
2, See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1998).
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1998).
30 See id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1998).
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the last of the New Deal federal securities regulatory statutes,
sets forth a much less intrusive scheme of regulation for in-
vestment advisers.
A merit model of regulation can be found in state blue sky
statutes. These statutes give a state, through its blue sky com-
missioner, the authority to prevent an issuer from selling its
securities in that state when the offering or the issuer's capital
structure is substantively unfair or presents an excessive risk
to investors.3 ' While not all states presently have or, in the
past have had, merit regulation, as opposed to full disclosure
statutes, a sufficient number of states historically retained
such laws so as to compel issuers making initial public offer-
ings on a nationwide basis to meet substantive capitalization
requirements.32 Another type of merit regulation can be found
in the listing requirements of stock exchanges and the Nation-
al Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation Sys-
tem ("Nasdaq7).
The type of capitalization matters addressed by merit
regulation include price-offering restrictions designed to pre-
vent undue dilution of shareholders' equity and limits on the
entrepreneurial profit that insiders, underwriters and other
promoters can make. 3 At the federal level, limitations on the
use of cheap stock, options and warrants as a means of com-
pensating underwriters are established by the National
Association of Securities Dealers Regulation, Inc. ("NASDR")
pursuant to its Rules of Fair Practice.' Listing requirements
typically address issuer size and earnings history and mandate
widespread equity distribution.35 In 1995, Congress gave the
"' See Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings [by the Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee],
41 BUS. LAW. 785, 787 (1986).
32 See Ronald M. Shapiro & Alan R. Sachs, Blue Sky Law and Practice: An
Overview, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1974).
' See Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure and the Allocation of Regulatory Re-
sponsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027 (1987).
14 See National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") CONDUCT
RULES 2710-2750 (1998).
" See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 1; see also Douglas C. Michael, Un-
tenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1463-77 (1992); Comment, Stock Exchange List-
ing Agreement as a Vehicle for Corporate Governance, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1427
(1981); NYSE Raises Bar on Listing Standards For IPOs, Exchange Transfers,
Global Firms, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 886 (June 12, 1998).
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SEC the power to define "qualified securities" in a national
market system; such securities have been defined to include
securities listed on a national securities market or Nasdaq.36
The SEC has articulated further merit standards for issuers by
permitting world class companies to use short form registra-
tion statements.7
Until quite recently, blue sky merit regulation was not
preempted by federal securities laws. Both the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act had savings clauses specifically assuring
against federal preemption. 38 However, most states retained a
blue-chip exemption from their blue sky laws for securities
that were listed on a national securities exchange and, in some
cases, securities that were listed on Nasdaq."5 This meant
that securities offerings which otherwise would have had to be
passed upon for fairness could go forward without review by
the state blue sky commissioner.
During the mid-1980s, blue sky merit regulation became
extremely unpopular. In keeping with a general deregulatory
trend in securities regulation, some states repealed merit regu-
lation and replaced it with full disclosure standards. ° Pres-
sure, nevertheless, began to build for preemption of state blue
sky laws, at least as to all national market system securities.
Congress acceded to this pressure in 1995 and enacted legisla-
tion eliminating blue sky review for all offerings of all national
market system securities.4 This legislation did not affect the
NASDR's review of corporate offerings. Rather, it had the
effect of putting more responsibility on the NASDR for regulat-
ing the fairness of public offerings from a capitalization stand-
point.
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(2) (1998);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule llAa2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Aa2-1 (1998).
See Securities Act Forms S-I, S-2 and S-3.
', See Brian J. Fahrney, Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for
Federal Pre-Emption Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 757-58 (1992).
39 Id. at 760 n.61.
40 See, e.g., Sidney Sosin & Roger G. Fein, The Landmark 1983 Amendments to
the Illinois Securities Law, 72 ILL. B.J. 196 (1983).
41 National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (1996).
1998]
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Although preemption of blue sky legislation was a
deregulatory measure, problems with the low-end of the public
offering market caused Congress to pass the Securities En-
forcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act to try to
regulate offerings for stocks in the under $5 range. 2 Similar
recent initiatives directed at microcap stocks have been under-
taken by the SEC, NASDR and the states. These programs
are directed at broker-dealers rather than issuers and do not
directly control issuer capitalization.
If Social Security were to be privatized, Congress could
require that equity investments by private investment ac-
counts be limited to national market securities or impose some
other merit-based standard on the investment of pension
funds. Moreover, Congress could encourage the SEC, by grant-
ing further authority to articulate merit standards for national
market system securities, to prevent investors from putting
their retirement savings into low end speculative securities.
Eliminating such speculative risk from the public securities
markets could have adverse effects on capital formation, how-
ever. While many low priced speculative offerings fail, some
succeed and become important contributors to the national
economy."
2. Corporate Governance
The Securities Act gave the SEC direct control of securities
distributions but little control over day-to-day corporate con-
duct. However, major amendments to the securities laws in
19644' gave the SEC the power to direct a continuous disclo-
sure system for all public corporations. The 1968 Williams Act
amendments to the Exchange Act' then gave the SEC regula-
tory authority over tender offers. Although, for the most part,
42 Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
' See NASAA Notes Recent Actions Targeting 'Boiler Room" Operations, 30 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (July 31, 1998); SEC Issues Proposals to Clamp Down
on Fraud in Microcap Stock Market, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 237 (Feb. 13,
1998).
44 See Gregg Ip, IPO Profusion: Bull Market Has Sired A Lot of New Stocks,
But Few Become Stars, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1998, at Al.
' Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565
(1964); see Exchange Act Release No. 7425, 29 Fed. Reg. 13455 (Sept. 15, 1964).
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1998).
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these amendments followed a disclosure mode of regulation,
the legislation also contained substantive provisions dictating
the conduct of contests for corporate control. The SEC's tenden-
cy to use disclosure for its prophylactic effect at times has gone
so far as to invite criticism. A 1977 Advisory Committee to the
SEC was prompted to recommend that the "Commission should
not adopt disclosure requirements which have as their princi-
pal objective the regulation of corporate conduct."47
In the context of a judicial climate that favored implied
rights of action and liberal interpretations of remedial stat-
utes,48 the SEC was able to utilize enforcement cases and dis-
closure rules to impose its notions about corporate governance
on public companies. In a wide variety of management fraud
cases,49 disclosure rules concerning management remunera-
tion 0 and hearings concerning corporate accountability,5 the
SEC indicated its interest in generally regulating corporate
governance. Thereafter, the securities laws were amended to
give the SEC significant new powers for doing so. In 1977,
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,52 giving
the SEC direct authority to regulate the internal accounting
controls of public corporations. In addition, in 1984 Congress
included in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act53 a new admin-
istrative power to sanction corporate officers responsible for
false filings with the SEC.5'
Over the past two decades, the SEC has been much less
aggressive in promoting corporate governance reform, and vari-
ous institutional investor and other private sector groups have
taken up the cause of shareholder democracy.55 Among other
47 HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC 305 (Comm.
Print 1977).
' See Louis Loss, Introduction: The Federal Securities Code-Its Purpose, Plan,
and Progress, 30 VAND. L. REV. 315 (1977).
4, See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 146-53 (1982).
"' See Securities Act Release No. 5856 (Aug. 18, 1977); Item 402, Regulation S-
K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1998).
5" Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,860 (Aug. 29, 1977); Ex-
change Act Release No. 13,482, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (Apr. 28, 1977).
52 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (1998)).
' Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o(d)(2), 78f(a)).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4).
5 See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. HofM Corporate Governance and Institu-
19981 1053
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reasons why the SEC has not sought new opportunities to
regulate internal corporate affairs is that the Supreme Court
determined that the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act
require deception, manipulation or nondisclosure. Claims can-
not be recognized for breaches of fiduciary duty without any
charge of manipulation or lack of disclosure." Further, in the
battle over dual class voting rights, the SEC endeavored to use
its power over SRO rulemaking to impose corporate gover-
nance standards on national market system-listed companies,
and the D.C. Circuit Court determined that the SEC exceeded
its statutory authority by so doing.57 The SEC has a long in-
stitutional memory, however, and when the times are political-
ly receptive, it can be anticipated that the SEC will utilize its
powers to advance corporate governance. Less exuberance in
the stock market or widespread scandals about a critical corpo-
rate governance issue such as executive compensation could
impel Congress to increase the SEC's authority to regulate
corporate conduct. If this were to coincide with Social Security
privatization, the SEC might obtain the authority to enforce
directors' fiduciary duties, a pbwer the SEC staff has long
advocated."
3. Issuer Registration and Disclosure
The registration provisions of the Securities Act are cen-
tral to the realization of the law's goal of full disclosure. 9
During the period when the securities laws were expanding in
coverage, the SEC insisted on a very narrow reading of exemp-
tions from registration, particularly the private placement
exemption." This interpretation was severely criticized by the
tional Activism, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1996, at 5; James M. Tobin, The Squeeze on
Directors-Inside is Out, 49 BUS. LAW. 1707, 1729-36 (1994).
56 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
5, See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
58 See Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time For a Federal Corporation Law?, 57
BROOK. L. REv. 55, 78-81 (1991).
"' Section 5 has been called the "heart7 of the statute. LOSS & SELIGMAN, su-
pra note 17, at 388.
' See William J. Carney, Exemptions from Securities Registration for Small
Issuers: Shifting From Full Disclosure, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 507, 513-44
(1975).
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securities bar, and pleas for reform led to the enactment of a
clearer and more objective private placement exemption.6 'The development of the "accredited investor" concept by
amendment to the Securities Act accelerated the trend toward
enlarging the private placement exemption.62 Indeed, the SEC
staff determined to foster the private placement market by
adopting improvements to the private placement rules and
adding some new rules.'
These developments were propelled in part by internation-
alization and institutionalization of the public securities mar-kets. However, encouraging issuers to avoid the registrationprocess masked technical problems with the registration provi-
sions, which had become increasingly outmoded.' Although
the SEC had been integrating the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act since the early 1980s, moving issuers from transac-
tional disclosure to continuous disclosure, integration of these
two statutes remained incomplete.' The 1996 Advisory Com-
mittee Report, headed by then SEC Commissioner Steven
Wallman, recommended that the SEC move to a system of
company disclosure.6 Under such a system, public companies
would be able to rely on their continuing SEC-filed disclosure
documents when making securities offerings.
" See William J. Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOK. L. REV.571 (1977); Note, Reforming the Initial Sale Requirements of the Private Placement
Exemption, 86 HARV. L. REV. 403 (1972).
2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1998). The "accredited investor"
exemption was added by section 602 of the Small Business Issuer's SimplificationAct of 1980, as a means of easing restrictions on private placements. Soon there-
after the SEC adopted Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. §§ 501-506 (1998).
' In addition to adopting Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 501-506, the SEC liberal-ized the private placement resale restrictions of Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 240.144(1998), and adopted Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1998), and Regulation S, 17C.F.R. § 230.901-.904 (1998). See Exchange Act Release Nos. 7390, 7391, 7392[1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [[ 85,907-09, at 89,256, 89,261,
89,279 (Feb. 20, 1997).
64 See SEC, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CAPITAL FORMATIONAND REGULATORY PROCESSES (July 24, 1996), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)No. 1726, at 46-51, 55-61 (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Wallman Report]; see alsoHow 144A Rules, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1, 1998, at 28.
, See Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-BasedAntifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 568-73 (1997). The SEC adopted itsintegrated disclosure policy in 1982. See Securities Act Release Nos. 6383, 6384
and 6385 (1982).
" See Wallman Report, supra note 64.
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Little progress has been made by the SEC in the direction
of company disclosure. However, the SEC has been rethinking
the breadth of some of the exemptions from regulation previ-
ously adopted. 7 Further, in recent years the staff has redis-
covered the appeal of the registration provisions in exerting
leverage over public companies." While company registration
could be a solution to many problems that have developed
under the registration provisions,69 company registration has
the potential for giving the SEC greater control over internal
corporate affairs. Under company disclosure, issuers, rather
than securities, would be required to register with the SEC.
This subtle shift would make public companies directly, rather
than indirectly, subject to the SEC's regulations. Thus, Social
Security privatization could give impetus to legislative amend-
ments integrating the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and
providing for company disclosure.
B. New Products Approvals
The SEC does not generally approve new financial prod-
ucts before they can be marketed. However, the SEC does
approve new financial products that national securities ex-
changes propose to list because the new exchange rules relat-
ing to such products must be reviewed and approved by the
SEC before they go into effect.70 The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC") similarly has authority to ap-
prove the design of all new financial futures listed on any
commodities exchange.7'
67 Regulation S is no longer available to U.S. issuers except 
for the sale of
"restricted" securities, see Securities Act Release No. 7505, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 9632 (Feb.
17, 1998), and there is a proposal to eliminate Rule 504. See Securities Act 
Re-
lease No. 7541 (May 21, 1998).
" See Waiman Report, supra note 64, at 56; Gerald S. Backman 
& Stephen E.
Kim, A Cure for Securities Act Metaphysics: Integrated Registration, INSIGHTS, May
1995, at 18.
"9 See, e.g., Dan L. Goldwasser, Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the
Task Force on Integration, 41 BUS. LAW. 595 (1986); Carl W. Schneider, Section
4(1*)-Private Resales of Restricted or Control Securities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 
501
(1988).
70 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(1), 
(2)
(1997); SEC Rule 19b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1998).
7'1 See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1998).
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A significant difference between the commodity futures
laws and the securities laws is that virtually all commodity
futures are required to be traded on commodity exchanges,72
whereas securities are not required to be so traded. According-
ly, if a financial product is classified as a security, no prior
government approval is required before the product can be
sold, although a registration statement might be required if
the product is marketed publicly. If the product is classified as
a commodity futures contract, however, the CFTC has authori-
ty to dictate its design. This difference, among other things,
has led to a continuous struggle between securities and com-
modities regulators, a struggle that has recently erupted over
control of the vast derivatives market."
Definitional distinctions also control whether the SEC or
other agencies regulate certain insurance and banking prod-
ucts.74 Defective product design or fraudulent selling practices
have separated numerous investors from their savings in both
bank and insurance products, and sometimes the SEC has
proven a more aggressive regulator than banking or insurance
commissioners, claiming jurisdiction over borderline prod-
ucts."5
72 See id. § 6(a) (1998).
See CFTC Offers Assurances for OTC Market, But Other Financial Regulators
Not Convinced, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1162 (July 31, 1998); John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., The OTC Derivatives Turf War, N.Y.L.J., July 23, 1998, at 5; Lewis D.
Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Anal-
ysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 219-22 (1988).
"' See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (notes sold by co-op to
raise money to support its general business operations are securities under the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. United
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (deferred annuity contract held to be an
investment contract within the terms of the Securities Act); Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. Bremont, 954 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (SEC fraud action involving
prime bank notes which, had they existed, would have been securities); Securities
and Exch. Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (SEC action against corporate sellers of commercial paper and their control-
ling persons for violations of registration provisions of the Securities Act); In re
Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (investors' action
against broker-dealers and promotional corporation, alleging federal securities viola-
tions due to the omission of material information in connection with their sale of
single premium deferred annuities).
" See, e.g., Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuities subject to the Securities Act); Securi-
ties and Exch. Comm'n v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(viatical settlement contracts are not insurance contracts that are exempt from
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Although some scholars advocate regulatory arbitrage as
efficient, 6 in my view, jurisdictional battles between regula-
tors are unseemly and undermine public confidence in the
financial markets and their regulators. If analyzed in the con-
text of Social Security privatization, disputes over the approval
and regulation of new financial products raise some interesting
issues. Should private investment accounts be allowed to in-
vest in all types of financial products? If so, should regulators
be authorized to review the design of new products to deter-
mine their degree of risk?
It can be argued that these issues and other issues that
have been raised in Part I of this Article do not need to be
addressed because it is likely that private investment accounts
will be permitted to invest only in certain mutual funds desig-
nated by the government.77 However, utilizing financial inter-
mediaries to review investment products does not solve the
basic problem of assuring older citizens a minimum pension.
Institutions can be misguided, and their trading tends to exag-
gerate stock market volatility. Further, the problem of deter-
mining what financial products intermediaries should be per-
mitted to purchase and trade and how and by what agencies
such financial products should be regulated does not disappear
because financial intermediaries are layered between the So-
cial Security Administration and citizens or pensioners. In-
deed, this contemplated regulatory scheme only raises prob-
lems concerning the regulation of financial intermediaries.
securities regulation under McCarran-Ferguson Act, but the contracts are not secu-
rities subject to federal securities laws because profits from their purchase do not
derive predominantly from the efforts of those other than investors); Gary Plastic
Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230 (2d
Cir. 1985) (certificates of deposit sold by the investment firm were "securities"
within antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws); Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964) (variable annu-
ity contract plan subject to the Investment Company Act).
76 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26
J.L. & ECON. 23, 34-35 (1983); Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure In Futures
Markets: Jurisdictional Competition Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agen-
cies, 4 J. OF FUTURES AM E 367, 383 (1984); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Sym-
posium on the Regulation of Capital Markets, Competition Versus Consolidation:
The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regula-
tion, 50 Bus. LAW. 447 (1995).
" See GRAMLICH, supra note 2, at 83-84; Gregg et al., supra note 1.
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C. Safety and Soundness Assurances
Regulators worry about the financial stability of individual
financial institutions and about systemic risks to the overall fi-
nancial system. The customers of financial institutions are
protected to a limited extent against loss of the capital they
have entrusted to a financial company. In addition, capital
adequacy rules protect both the viability of a particular firm
and prevent a chain reaction of bankruptcies if a single firm
collapses. Yet, different financial regulators apply different
types of regulations.
Banks are permitted to use the capital of depositors as
bank capital; therefore, federal deposit insurance provided by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") protects
such depositors and sustains their confidence to leave their
savings with banks. Such deposits have dollar-limited guaran-
tees which are aimed generally at protecting the retail custom-
er.78 The purpose of deposit insurance is to prevent bank
runs; thus, such insurance helps to guard against systemic risk
as well as to give individual customers protection.7" In addi-
tion, bank capital adequacy rules are designed to prevent bank
insolvencies.' Since banks are subject to a dual regulatory
system at both the state and federal levels, in the past some
state banks were guaranteed only by state guaranty funds.
This is no longer the case since some of the state guaranty
funds proved inadequate for the protection of depositors."'
Currently, the FDIC insures all U.S. banks, including savings
banks, whether they are chartered nationally or in a state.82
" The FDIC is a federally created corporation established to insure the depos-
its of banks and savings associations. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a), 1813(c)(2) (1998).
Depositors of such institutions enjoy deposit insurance not to exceed $100,000 for
each depositor at every insured depository institution. Id. § 1821(a)(1)(B), (C).
71 1A MICHIE ON BANKs AND BANKING § 26 (1993).
'0 The risk-based capital adequacy rules promulgated by the FDIC are codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 (1998).
"' See David Ibata, Business as Usual in S&Ls Outside Ohio, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
16, 1985, at C2; Quiet Reported as Thrifts Begin to Open Doors; Limited Service
Plan Allows Withdrawal of $750 a Month, AM. BANKER, Mar. 22, 1985, at 1.
" See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (1998). Credit unions, not technically banks, have
different federal regulations and insurance. See 12 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (1998).
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Customers of brokerage firms also enjoy federal deposit
insurance under the Securities Investor Protection Act of
197083 ("SIPC") with respect to cash and securities on deposit.
However, brokers are not permitted to use these funds in the
operation of their own businesses. Rather, all free cash balanc-
es and fully-paid-for securities must be segregated for the
benefit of their customers." Federal insurance provided by
SIPC is subject to dollar limits like bank deposit insurance and
has the similar objective of guaranteeing that such customers'
property is not lost in the event of an insolvency. In addition,
such insurance helps to prevent a chain reaction of insolven-
cies. Like the bank regulators, the SEC imposes capital ade-
quacy rules on broker-dealers, and these rules are designed to
prevent the repercussions of one firm's collapse from spreading
to other financial institutions.8
The customers of commodity futures merchants are pro-
tected by exchange guaranty funds, and systemic risk is guard-
ed against by margin and capital adequacy rules." Insurance
company policyholders are likewise protected by guaranty
funds and capital adequacy rules." However, since insurance
companies are not regulated at the federal level but rather by
the states, the viability of state insurance guaranty funds var-
ies as does the financial regulation of insurance companies.
Currently, all of these financial industries are consolidat-
ing, within their discrete industries and across industry lines,
nationally and internationally. Such conglomeration is consid-
" 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa et seq. (1998). The Securities Investor Protection Corpo-
ration, a federal insurer similar to the FDIC, is authorized to pay up to $500,000,
but not more than $100,000 for a cash claim, to satisfy the net equity claims of
customers. Id. § 78fff-3(a).
Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1998).
85 Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1998).
See Commodity Exchange Act, § 4(), 7 U.S.C. § 6f (1998); Andrea M.
Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures Broker
Insolvencies: Futures Positions Transfers from Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 849, 867-71 (1987); Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the
Commodity Futures Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 130-32
(1991).
8 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND
INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO CAPITAL AND RISK 33, 44, 64-67 (GAO/GGD-98-153, July
1998) [hereinafter GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL]; see also Francine L. Semaya &
Lenore S. Marema, State Insurer Insolvency System in Need of Repair, NATVL L.J.,
Aug. 26, 1996, at C4.
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erably ahead of the existing balkanized regulatory system for
financial institutions. Although Congress has been attempting
to reform federal financial regulation for many years, to date it
has not had the political will or wisdom to achieve this goal.s
The advent of Social Security privatization would give a great-
er urgency to the need for reform of the regulation of financial
institutions because it would transfer savings into the private
sector in an amount that would change the nature of the capi-
tal markets.89
Although crises in the financial markets have tested the
current regulatory scheme from time to time, there has not
been a sufficiently serious financial crash since 1987 to deter-
mine whether current customer insurance and financial ade-
quacy rules are sufficiently stringent to guard against systemic
failure.' In the past, even if savings were lost because of the
failure of a particular financial institution, Social Security
served as a safety net of last resort. Today, nearly half of all
American households own shares in some form, compared with
25 percent before the 1987 stock market crash and 3 percent in
1929.91 If Social Security is privatized, virtually all U.S.
households will have savings in the stock market, and finan-
cial regulators may be forced to look more critically at existing
financial requirements to determine whether the financial
' See Michael Schroeder, Senate Bank Panel by 16-2 Vote, Clears Compromise
Financial-Services Measure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1998, at A4.
" It is estimated that there could be 140 million private investment accounts
if Social Security is privatized. GRAMLICH, supra note 2, at 62. Even if only a
small percentage of payroll taxes is put into these accounts and only a small per-
centage of these funds are invested, directly or indirectly, in the public securities
markets, billions of dollars would nevertheless be added to these markets. The
Social Security Administration estimates that the size of its fund's portfolio will be
$1 trillion by 2014. Social Securities?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 28.
" In 1987, the stock market averages dropped 30% in a week's time. Report of
the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Spe-
cial Report No. 1267, at 1 (Jan. 12, 1988). Although no large financial institutions
collapsed, the NYSE came very close to closing, and such a move could have trig-
gered a financial panic. TIM METZ, BLACK MONDAY 193-95, 207-09 (1988). On Octo-
ber 27, 1997 the stock market averages fell 554 points, but this was only a 7.2%
decline. The market decline in the summer of 1998 may test the sufficiency of fi-
nancial adequacy rules. See Anita Raghavan & Matt Murray, Financial Firms Lose
$8 Billion So Far, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1998, at A2.
" Grin and Bear it, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1998, at 15.
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institutions holding retirement savings are sufficiently well
capitalized and well controlled to withstand the severest of
financial shocks.
D. Regulation of Investment Companies and Investment
Advisers
Investment companies are heavily regulated by the SEC.
They must have independent directors on their boards,92 and
such directors must approve any advisory contacts with an
investment adviser. 3 Various types of conflict of interest
transactions are prohibited or regulated,' and capital struc-
tures are constrained. 5 In addition, investment companies
are subject to the registration requirements of the Securities
Act and the annual reporting requirements of the Exchange
Act.96 Nevertheless, as long as the investment policies of an
investment company are disclosed and maintained, there are
no restrictions on what securities they can buy or sell or the
velocity of their trading. Indeed, since open-end investment
companies are required to be sufficiently liquid to be able to
redeem shares on a daily basis, 7 trading by investment com-
panies significantly contributes to the severity and speed of
market declines.9" Although investment advisory contacts
must be reviewed and approved by a board's independent di-
rectors, investment companies and their adviser reside under
the roof of the same management company. Investment compa-
ny boards may negotiate fees with the adviser, but it would be
extraordinary for an investment company to change advis-
ers.
99
92 The membership of a board of directors of an SEC-registered investment
company may not include more than 60% of members who are "interested persons"
of the investment company. Investment Company Act, § 10(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-10(a) (1998). The SEC staff believes that the number of independent inves-
tors should be increased to a majority. PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 7, at
253-54.
Investment Company Act of 1940, §15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1998).
14 See, e.g., id. §§ 15, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15, 17.
See id. § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18.
9 See id. § 24(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24.
See id. § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22. For this reason, open-end investment com-
panies must hold 85% of their assets in liquid securities. See PROTECTING INVES-
TORS, supra note 7, at 429.
's See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 73, at 240-46.
'9 The SEC staff has recommended that the independent directors be given the
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In contrast to the regulation of investment companies and
other financial intermediaries, investment advisers are lightly
regulated. SEC-registered advisers are subject to recordkeeping
and reporting requirements'0 0 and must make certain written
disclosures to clients.' Further, the Advisers Act contains
some basic conflict of interest prohibitions.0 2 Where an in-
vestment adviser obtains custody or possession of a client's
funds or securities, the SEC requires such customer's property
to be segregated.'
1 3
There are two important respects, however, in which in-
vestment advisers are not regulated. First, there are no qualifi-
cations for becoming an investment adviser. Second, invest-
ment advisers are not subject to any capital adequacy require-
ments. There are some states that require individuals to pass
the North American Securities Administration Association, Inc.
("NASAA") Series 65 Uniform Investment Law Examination in
order to register as an investment adviser. This examination
was specifically designed to qualify candidates as investment
advisers. °'4 However, SEC-registered advisers are exempt
from state regulation; thus, they are not required to take the
Series 65 examination.0 5
Bills to enhance the regulation of investment advisers
were passed by the House of Representatives in 1993 and the
Senate in 1994 but never became law.0 6 This legislation
power to terminate advisory contracts, a power they do not now have. See PRO-
TECTING INVESTORS, supra note 7, at 268-69.
10 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1998).
z' See Investors Advisers Act Rule 204-3, 17 C.F.R. 275.204-3 (1998).
100 Performance fees are not permitted, Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
§ 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b), and capacity must be disclosed. Id. § 206, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6(3).
10 See Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-2, 17 C.F.R. 275.206.(4)-2(1) (1988).
10 See North Am. Sec. Admin. Ass'n, Inc. (visited Oct. 15, 1998)
<http-J/www.nasaa.org/exams/series65intro.html>.
" Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3A (1998) provides
that an investment adviser is subject either to state or federal regulation. In gen-
eral, advisers with assets under management of $25 million or more and advisers
to investment companies are required to register with the SEC. State regulation of
such advisers is preempted.
10 The House bill, H.R. 578, passed on May 4, 1993. The Senate bill, S. 423,
passed on November 20, 1993. The major differences in the bills involved disclo-
sure and suitability requirements. See Tamar Frankel, The Pros and Cons of a
Self-Regulatory Organization for Advisers and Mutual Funds, in INVESTMENT LAW
3 n.1 (1994).
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would have provided for the creation of a self-regulatory orga-
nization for investment advisers and bonding requirements.
The primary purpose of the proposed SRO for advisers was to
provide for more frequent examinations and establish required
minimum qualifications. This would have effected a fundamen-
tal change in the regulatory scheme which the industry op-
posed.' °7 After the balance between federal and state regula-
tion of advisers was altered in 1996,0 the problems of regu-
lating unqualified and undercapitalized investment advisers
was sloughed off to the states.
If Social Security is privatized in a way that permits the
owners of private investment accounts to select their own in-
vestments, investment advisers to non-institutional investors
may become critical financial intermediaries. Congress could
limit the management of private investment accounts to SEC-
registered advisers, and such a responsibility could lead to a
strengthening of their regulation by the SEC. Alternatively,
Congress could not impose such a limitation but strengthen
the regulation of advisers in other ways, including complete
federal preemption of adviser registration and regulation.
In addition, more rigorous requirements could be imposed
upon investment advisers to investment companies, especially
if private investment accounts are permitted to invest in mutu-
al funds. If so, it is quite possible that the Social Security Ad-
ministration would certify the funds in which private invest-
ment accounts could invest. Perhaps funds certified for invest-
ment by the Social Security Administration would have to
select advisers on the basis of competitive bids or other objec-
tive criteria.0 9 Perhaps such funds would be required to hold
securities on a long term basis in order to curtail market vola-
tility."0 Perhaps a majority of investment company directors
would be required to be independent, and the compensation of
f See id. at 6.
" See infra notes 115-20.
Cf 41 U.S.C. §§ 253b, 414 (1998).
.10 Since pension funds and defined contribution plans can trade securities with-
out any tax consequences, they have no incentive to hold for the long term. See
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, An Overview of Program Trading and Its Impact on
Current Market Practices, NYSE, Dec. 21, 1987, at 5; Ellen E. Schultz, Big Re-
demptions Usually Don't Hurt Returns of Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1998, at
C1.
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directors of such funds would be curtailed."' If these and
similar proposals may seem fanciful, it is only necessary to
consider the myriad ways in which the government imposes
financial constraints and social policy ideas on business
through the tax code and government contract policies to imag-
ine the political appeal of controlling the flow of billions of
dollars of capital investment."
II. A SHIFT TO THE CENTER
A. Altering the Balance Between Federal and State Regulation
1. Securities Regulation
For over 60 years securities regulation was a dual federal
and state system, and Congress was extremely reluctant to use
federal securities legislation to preempt state securities or
corporation law. During this period, the SEC was perceived by
business managers as a more aggressive regulator than state
securities regulators; therefore, political opposition to increased
SEC jurisdiction was generally at the ready. In the past few
years, the balance of federal and state securities regulatory
power has shifted markedly in the direction of federal preemp-
tion. This is a significant shift caused by a variety of factors.
Globalization rendered state securities regulation of new offer-
ings costly and inefficient."' Also, deregulation at the federal
level proceeded more expeditiously than at the state level.
Therefore, a consensus was developed by the securities indus-
try for preemption of financial institution regulation and secu-
rities litigation."4
. See supra note 92; cf. I.R.C. § 162(m) (1998).
"' See Social Securities?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 28.
"' See Fahrney, supra note 38, at 754.
". See Jeffrey Taylor, Wall Street Bill Is Likely To Advance, WALL ST. J., May
15, 1996, at Cl; Broker-Dealer Duties, Preemption, CEA Reform Issues Confront
Congress, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 66 (Jan. 17, 1997). Although securities
firms are more comfortable dealing with the SEC as a regulator than with 50
state securities regulators, industrial corporations prefer dealing with state legis-
lators. See, e.g., infra note 124.
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The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996
("1996 Act") accomplished significant preemption of state secu-
rities regulation as to securities offerings and money manage-
ment."5 The SEC was designated as the exclusive regulator
of national securities offerings, eliminating previous state blue
sky authority. The states do retain their antifraud enforcement
powers but may neither impose registration or qualification on
"covered securities" nor regulate the disclosure documents used
in offerings."' 6 The states are also prohibited from regulating
disclosure documents such as proxy statements and annual
reports and from conducting merit reviews."7 The 1996 Act
also exempted from state registration and regulation SEC-
registered investment companies,"' sales of securities to
"qualified purchasers,""9 private placements and certain oth-
er exempt offerings. 2 ' The 1996 Act further preempted state
blue sky regulation of investment advisers to investment com-
panies, advisers with $250 million under management and cer-
tain other advisers operating on a national, rather than state,
level.'12
1
The 1996 Act was designed to make the SEC the exclusive
regulator of securities underwritings and large money manag-
ers. A series of court cases in recent years have found preemp-
tion of national market system trading activities resulting from
SEC oversight and rulemaking.' These cases contrast with
refusals by the courts to find that SEC rulemaking preempted
state anti-takeover statutes during the 1980s."= Pending leg-
11 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal, NSMIA and Preemp-
tion of State Securities Registration (Pt. I), 20 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (CBC)
(May 1998).
11 Securities Act of 1933, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (1998). Generally, "covered
securities" are securities listed on the NYSE, American Stock Exchange or Nasdaq.
Id. § 18(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (1998).
" See id. § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §77r(a). There is an exemption for a corporation's
state of incorporation.
... See id. § 18(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2).
119 See id. § 18(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3).
120 See id. § 18(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4).
... See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203a(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (1998).
1 See, e.g., Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 688 N.E.2d 620 (Ill. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1518 (1998); Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282
(N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1250 (1997); Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co.,
545 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996).
" See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th
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islation that would preempt state court, securities fraud ac-
tions involving nationally traded securities is strongly backed
by industrial as well as securities businesses." 4 This legisla-
tion is aimed at closing a perceived loophole in the 1995 Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act by extending its stan-
dards to actions now being brought in the state courts."2
2. Commodities Regulation
Commodities regulation is essentially federal, with only
limited areas of state antifraud jurisdiction. The CFTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over exchange traded commodities fu-
tures contracts. 26 This jurisdiction was designed to preempt
the field insofar as futures regulation was concerned, a marked
change from regulation prior to the creation of the CFTC in
1974.127
The greatest jurisdictional disputes in the commodities
area are those between the SEC and the CFTC involving fi-
nancial futures. Although bills to consolidate these agencies
have occasionally been proposed,2 s they have never gone far.
The SEC and the CFTC have different oversight committees in
Congress, and these committees are not inclined to relinquish
their authority. Also, the commodities exchanges are reluctant
to be regulated by the SEC. 9
Cir. 1989); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
12 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, S. 1260, H.R. 1689, 105th
Cong. (1998); see also House Panel Reports Securities Litigation Standards Bill To
Full Committee, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 883 (June 12, 1998).
125 The 1995 Act added section 27 to the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
(1998), and section 21D to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78uD (1998). For a de-
scription of the legislative history and provisions of this statute see generally LOSS
& SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 4636-669.
126 See Commodity Exchange Act, § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (1998).
121 See H.R. REP. NO. 1383 at 35 (1974); S. REP. NO. 1131 at 6, 23 (1994); see
also Rice v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
123 See H.R. 718, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2550, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 965,
102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 4477, 101st Cong. (1990). Although these bills never be-
came law, legislation to clarify the demarcation between CFTC and SEC regulation
has been passed. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat
2294 (1983) (implementing the Shad-Johnson Accord and codifying it as amended
in various sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
126 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture,
93d Cong. 105, 113-14, 249, 253 (1974).
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3. Bank Regulation
State regulation of state chartered banks still operates in
tandem with federal bank regulation. However, state bank
regulatory authority has been giving way to federal authority
as a result of the bank financial crisis of the 1980s and inter-
nationalization, among other factors. The deregulation of inter-
est rates by Congress in 1980130 unleashed pressures for
greater bank powers that some states granted to state char-
tered savings and loan associations with generally dire re-
sults. 131 Congressional bailouts of this industry and problems
with some state guarantee funds led to a sweeping realign-
ment of the federal regulatory agencies that expanded federal
regulatory authority over thrifts and commercial banks and
included a new regime of exclusive federal bank insurance.' 31
The widespread entry of foreign banks into the United States
came to be regulated at the federal level. 33 Moreover, the
newly acquired ability of banks to do business and merge
across state lines has recently led to the growth of larger inter-
state banks and bank holding companies regulated at the
federal level. 3
30 Such deregulation was accomplished by the Depositary Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
13' See Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7,
S34-36 (1991). The causes and costs of bank expansion and contraction in the
1980s is summarized in LAWRENCE J. WHITE, WHY NoW? CHANGE AND TURMOIL IN
U.S. BANKING 7-12 (Group of Thirty Occasional Paper 38, 1992).
13 See Felsenfeld, supra note 131, at S49-55. This was accomplished by the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989); see also DiVall Insured Income v. Boatmen's First
Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
33 See Daniel B. Gail et al., The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991: Ex-
panding the Umbrella of 'Supervisory Reregulation," 26 INT'L LAW. 993 (1992);
Patricia S. Skigen & John D. Fitzsimmons, The Impact of the International Bank-
ing Act of 1978 on Foreign Banks and Their Domestic and Foreign Affiliates, 35
Bus. LAw. 55 (1979).
134 See PAULINE FEUER & MELANIE FINE, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY
LAW §§ 1.01, 1.04(3), 17.01(10)-(17) (1998). Until passage of the Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 43), bank holding companies could not acquire a bank outside their home state
unless the state in which the target was located permitted the acquisition.
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4. Insurance Companies
Insurance companies are regulated by state, rather than
federal, regulators. This regulation is similar to the regulation
of banks and securities firms in that insurers must be char-
tered, meet capital and solvency requirements and conform to
restrictions on their investment portfolios."5 Although insur-
ance is a business in interstate commerce and, therefore, could
be regulated by the federal government, 1 6 the insurance in-
dustry finds major advantages to state regulation, and it will
not be easily displaced or changed."'
Nevertheless, there are some strong forces pushing insur-
ance companies in the direction of federal regulation. The in-
solvencies of Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company in 1991
and Confederation Life Insurance Company in 1994 demon-
strated problems with state insurance guaranty funds."' A
flurry of mis-selling cases against life insurance companies has
raised questions about the adequacy of state regulation of
insurance products." 9 Most importantly, the conglomeration
of financial institutions means that insurance company parents
or subsidiaries are now regulated by federal financial regulato-
ry agencies. 4 ° Further, the need for greater capital resources
135 See WILLIAM A. LOVETr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW 344-45
(1997).
13 See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
131 See LOVETr, supra note 135, at 345. But see Etti G. Baranoff & Daniel
Gattis, Measuring Attitudes Toward Regulation, BESTS REV. P/C, Sept. 1998, at
67.
138 See June D'Arista & Tom Schlesinger, The Emerging Parallel Banking Sys-
tem, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 497 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed. 1997).
' See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Litig., 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.
1998) (class action by policy holder against life insurer alleging a variety of decep-
tive sales practices); Duhaime v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 177 F.R.D.
54 (D. Mass. 1997) (class action by policyholders against insurance company con-
cerning alleged deceptive and misleading sales practices); Oswald v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 968 F. Supp. 639 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (policyholders sued life insurer for
fraud and negligence based on misrepresentations allegedly made by insurer); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac., 975 F. Supp. 584 (D.N.J. 1997) (policyhold-
ers brought class action against life insurer for deceptive sales practices by churn-
ing to sell replacement policies and misrepresentations about vanishing premiums
and use of insurance policies as investment vehicles); Lott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
849 F. Supp. 1451 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (suit by policyholders that life insurance com-
pany fraudulently induced them to buy life insurance).
1" See Stephen E. Frank, Banks & Brokers: Brokers' Insurers Queue Up for
Thrift Charters, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1997, at C1.
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on the part of insurance companies is leading to
demutualization so that investors, as well as policyholders, will
now have an interest in insurance rates and the development
of new products.' Moreover, investors generally look to
Washington rather than the states for protection.
Privatization of Social Security, however, could be a new
and more urgent cause of a reconsideration of federal regula-
tion of insurance. This is because the most likely way in which
the holder of a private investment account will receive retire-
ment income upon reaching retirement age will be to purchase
an annuity.'42 This means that the federal government will
have a serious interest in assuring the viability of such an
annuity, which is an insurance product. The government could
set up its own insurance corporation to provide annuities, or it
could mandate the purchase of annuities from a private sector
insurer. However, it would be anomalous for a retirement
annuity mandated by federal law to be differently regulated
and insured depending on the state in which the insurance
company issuing the annuity is incorporated. Further, some
type of federal government guaranty that the annuity be paid
would seem necessary instead of reliance on the state insur-
ance guaranty funds.
5. Pensions
Prior to the mid 1970s, corporate pensions were regulated
on the federal level, if at all, by the Internal Revenue Service.
However, many pension funds lacked sufficient funding or
reserves and when a company went out of business or its plan
terminated, the pension benefits of many workers were im-
paired. Other serious problems included delays in vesting
and lack of portability.' The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7) 14 addressed these problems
..1 See Michael A. Cohen et al., End of an Era?, BESTS REVIEW P/C, Aug. 1998,
at 75.
142 See Moore, supra note 9; Mary Jane Fisher, Major Social Security Reforms
Proposed, NATL UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH/FIN., May 25, 1998, at 1.
' See LOVE,'r, supra note 135, at 402.
14 See International Bd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
15 Pub. L. No. 93-405, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1998)).
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and, among other things, strengthened funding and fiduciary
discipline and established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration ("PBGC") to ensure that vested benefits would survive
plan terminations.
ERISA mandates fiduciary responsibility for investment
managers, trustees or any other person with control over a
pension plan or its assets.4 6 However, the managers used by
private pension funds are not regulated by any one regulator.
A large number of plans are managed by insurance companies
regulated by state insurance commissioners.147 Most of the
remaining private pension funds are managed by banks, and
the federal and state banking laws provide guidelines for their
investment management.'48 Where funds are managed by
broker-dealers or by mutual funds, there are no investment
guidelines.'49
The PBGC insures vested pension benefits. If a pension
plan is terminated, the PBGC guarantees basic, vested bene-
fits, up to a monthly dollar limit, for defined benefit plans. 5 °
However, the PBGC does not insure defined contribution plans.
Further, it does not actively monitor the financial soundness of
pensions and has limited corrective order authority. 5'
The Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice share responsibility for pension plan supervision under
ERISA. Suits to enforce the fiduciary liabilities arising under
ERISA may be brought by the Secretary of Labor, plan partici-
pants or beneficiaries or other fiduciaries.'52 Interestingly,
ERISA preempted state law as to these and other matters.'
Such preemption includes possible state common law
claims."5
... See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21)(A), 1104(a) (1998).
147 See LOVETT, supra note 135, at 408-09.
14 See id.
149 See id.
1'- See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1322a, 1322b (1998); Barry Rehfeld, David and the
Pension Goliaths, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1, 1998, at 71.
151 LOVErr, supra note 135, at 414; see also Fran Hawthorne, The Other Retire-
ment Crisis, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1998, at 61.
' See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), (5) (1998).
113 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, section 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (1999), states that ERISA supersedes "any and all state laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to an employee benefit plan.' Id.
... See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 44, 52 (1987); Romney v.
Lin, 94 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1996). But see Heather M. Susac, Comment, Romney
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A commentator on the sweeping preemption of state com-
mon law claims under ERISA observed that "Republican lead-
ers cling to state rights when it is expedient - for instance,
dismantling the national welfare system," but when it comes to
claims under ERISA (in this case with respect to suits against
health maintenance organizations), "Republican leaders in the
Senate and House are stalwart defenders of federal
power ... ."" This same observation could be made about all
financial regulation. Where business perceives that federal
preemption will result in less regulation and less civil liability,
it has been pushed successfully. However, there is no reason to
assume that in a different political climate, the federal regula-
tory agencies that have benefited from such preemption in
terms of increased regulatory authority will remain as reluc-
tant to use their powers as they have been during a period of
deregulation. Further, in response to economic crisis, and in
particular the failure of financial institutions or intermediaries
or the failure of state guaranty funds for creditors of failed
institutions or intermediaries, Congress, whether Democratic
or Republican, has been quick to put federal insurance
schemes in place with concomitant federal regulation.
Social Security privatization will probably further this long
term trend toward stronger federal regulation of financial
intermediaries and preemption of remaining state regulation.
Social Security is now a federal program. Privatization of So-
cial Security will not solve the current funding problems of this
program, but it will stave off efforts to increase Social Security
benefits and worsen funding problems." However, if an in-
creasing proportion of retirement savings are in private invest-
ment accounts, responsible financial regulators will appreciate
that unless accounts are prudently invested with financial
intermediaries that are adequately regulated as to their capital
adequacy, investment mismanagement or financial crisis will
wreak havoc with the retirement expectations of a large num-
v. Lin: ERISA Preemption of Section 630 of New York's Business Corporation Law,
71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 691 (1997).
... Jamie Court, ERISA Makes for Odd Bedfellows, NATL L.J., Aug. 24, 1998, at
A19.
... See The Perils of Privatisation, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 15, 1998, at 65.
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ber of older people. Further, only the federal government has
the power and financial resources to appropriately ensure the
solvency of these retirement accounts.
B. Federal Agency Consolidation
Financial institutions in the United States are subject to a
balkanized regulatory system involving numerous federal and
state securities, commodities, banking and insurance regula-
tors. Yet, the federal government provides lender-of-last-resort
protection to all segments of the financial industry. Further,
the nation's safety net is inconsistent and also overbur-
dened. 5 '
According to a recent report of the General Accounting
Office,'58 although activities of large U.S. banks, securities
firms and insurance companies have converged to a significant
extent, firms in each of these sectors have different regulators
and these regulators have different oversight purposes and
regulatory requirements. For example, bank capital standards
are designed with an eye toward maintaining bank safety and
soundness and calculate capital on a going concern basis.'59
Since the FDIC insures bank depositors who lend capital to
banks and are bank creditors, capital adequacy rules also are
aimed at protecting deposit insurance funds.' In addition,
bank regulators are concerned about the viability of the pay-
ments system controlling the money supply, funding the na-
tional debt and systemic risk. There are numerous conflicts
among bank regulators (without regard to their conflicts with
other financial regulators), in part because different regulators
have different concerns and responsibilities.
Capital standards for securities broker-dealers and futures
commission merchants are focused on protecting customers in
the event of a broker-dealer or FCM failure and are calculated
' See Arista & Schlesinger, supra note 138, at 497. The federal safety net in-
cludes deposit insurance, access to the Federal Reserve Board's discount window
and the Federal Reserve Board's large dollar payment system. See Keith R. Fisher,
Reweaving the Safety Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activ-
ities, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 131-32 (1992).
I" See GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 87.
... See GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 87, at 5, 42-43.
'6 See GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 87, at 5, 42-43.
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on a liquidation basis.'6' SIPC insures the cash and fully-
paid-for securities in brokerage customers' accounts, and com-
modities exchanges guarantee the obligations of FCMs and
others for commodities futures contracts traded on exchanges.
No agency is responsible for insuring the viability of unregis-
tered firms engaged in off-exchange trading of derivatives.
Further, the objective of securities regulation is to protect
investors through full disclosure in order to encourage capital
formation. Providing federal insurance against foolish invest-
ment decision-making would put the government, instead of
the markets, in charge of determining what corporations de-
serve fresh capital. This is the crux of the dilemma that will
face legislators and regulators if Social Security is privatized.
How can retirees be guaranteed a pension if they are required
to establish personal investment accounts and may then choose
to invest in any type of financial vehicle either directly or
through, for example, a mutual fund?
Open-end investment companies are regulated to ensure
that their shares are redeemable on a daily basis, but there is
no federal insurance program to pay off fund holders if this
proves impossible. Further, the need to have cash available to
pay off mutual fund shareholders has contributed to market
volatility and exacerbated stock market declines.'62 Invest-
ment advisers are relatively lightly regulated and are not sub-
ject to capital requirements.
Capital standards for life insurance companies are de-
signed to ensure the long term viability of firms and to protect
policyholders, and capital is calculated on a going concern
basis.'63 Since many insurers are mutual companies, insur-
ance rate regulation has been designed to keep insurance rates
low rather than to generate a profit for insurers. As insurance
companies demutualize and merge with other financial institu-
tions, this focus will necessarily shift. Hopefully, the result will
not be similar to the savings and loan debacle which resulted
from S&L demutualization and deregulation.
161 See GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 87, at 54-58.
' See E.S. Browning, Industrials Dive 512.61 Points, or 6.37%; Tech-Stock
Tumble Sinks Nasdaq Index, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1998, at Cl; E.S. Browning,
Blue Chips Fall 45.06 Points in Volatile Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1998, at
Cl; see also Solomon & Dicker, supra note 73, at 240-46.
"3 See GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 87, at 64-67.
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As financial institutions have become larger and more
complex, their importance to the national economy increases.
The bank regulators have a de facto too-big-to-fail policy. The
SEC does not, but this has never been tested by the failure of
a giant securities firm conglomerate.' If more retirement
savings are held and disbursed by private financial institutions
than by the Social Security Administration, what type of capi-
tal or financial adequacy rules will be necessary and appropri-
ate to insure that funds held by financial institutions to pay
pensions are forthcoming? This is a different issue than pro-
tecting investors against poor investment decisions. It is the
problem the PBGC was created to solve for defined benefit
retirement plans, but the PBGC does not insure defined contri-
bution plans. This is already a serious problem, not addressed
by existing federal legislation, and it will be greatly exaggerat-
ed by Social Security privatization.
The U.S. capital markets have been burdened with single
industry regulation by diverse regulators, frequently quarrel-
ing instead of cooperating, for most of our economic history. At
worst, this results in government sanctioned financial services
cartels that are inefficient and anticompetitive.'65 At best,
this system permits creative financial institutions to experi-
ment with innovative new services on a scale that results in
incremental rather than drastic change and permits regulators
to engage in functional regulation that can be accommodated
by the existing regulatory system." Although the current
system makes little regulatory or economic sense, it is politi-
cally expedient for the financial services industry, financial
1' See Kevin G. Salwen, Review of Drexel Prompts SEC to Bolster Investigations
of Financial Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1990, at 09. Recently, the Federal
Reserve Board intervened to prevent the failure of a large hedge fund, an entity
not regulated by anyone. See Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A
Hedge Fund Falters, So the Fed Persuades Big Banks to Ante Up, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 1998, at Al.
" See Kenneth Scott, The Uncertain Course of Bank Deregulation, 5 REG. 40
(1981); see also Fisher, supra note 157, at 131.
' The SEC has long advocated functional regulation in response to legislative
proposals to lift restraints on bank powers. See THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1997 480
(PLI Course Handbook Series B-980, Vol. 3, 1997). An exhaustive analysis of addi-
tions to bank regulatory powers that has resulted in the mixing of the insurance,
securities and banking sectors despite the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of com-
mercial and investment banking, 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 and 378 (1998), is contained
in Fisher, supra note 157.
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regulators and Congress. 1 7 However, technology, globaliza-
tion, and the institutionalization of capital markets have made
this regulatory system obsolete, and sooner or later Congress
will have to establish a more coherent and realistic regulatory
system.
Privatization of Social Security would markedly increase
the size of the private capital markets, probably increase rath-
er than decrease institutionalization and, therefore, the volatil-
ity of those markets, and put an enormous strain on financial
institutions and regulators. Continued conglomeration of finan-
cial services firms is one likely response to this strain. If this
occurs, functional regulation is not an optimal solution to the
ensuing regulatory challenges but can be only an interim or
partial solution. Some financial regulator must be made re-
sponsible for monitoring the holding company parents of huge
financial conglomerates. When banks began to form holding
companies, the Federal Reserve Board was made the regulator
of the large money center bank holding companies." 8 Howev-
er, the SEC and CFTC have no authority to regulate the par-
ent holding companies of brokers or FCMs. "9 Is the Federal
Reserve Board, which has critical central bank functions, also
the appropriate regulator for holding companies in the secu-
rities or insurance businesses? Should all financial futures and
16 A strong populist sentiment has contributed to the development of weak
banks and a divided regulatory system. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 1991 COLUM. L. REv. 10; Mark J. Roe, Some Differ-
ences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE
L.J. 1927, 1948-49 (1993). Price fixing, blessed as rate making and the carving up
of markets, has been an industry reaction. Single industry regulators are naturally
reluctant to cede jurisdiction and power to other regulators, see Baranoff & Gattis,
supra note 137, setting up a perfect scenario for the operation of public choice
theory, which suggests that regulations will tend to favor (subsidize) relatively
small and well organized groups that have a high per capita stake in regulations
at the expense of large poorly organized groups. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J.
RIcHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 21-23 (1981). Since the fi-
nancial regulators have, to some extent, different oversight committees in Con-
gress, the power to oversee agencies and to extract PAC money from financial
firms fearful of increased or new regulation has proven a powerful incentive to
maintain the regulatory status quo. See Phil Kuntz, Per Usual, Bank Bill Fails to
Pass but Succeeds As Big Congressional Campaign Fund-Raiser, WALL ST. J., Oct.
20, 1998, at A24.
16 This was accomplished by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
169 See GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 87, at 31.
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securities be regulated by the same agency? Should insurance
continue to be regulated by the states? Should the dual bank-
ing system be continued? The answer to such questions can be
postponed only until there is a serious financial crisis that
demonstrates the weaknesses of the current regulatory system.
If Social Security savings are to be placed into the system, it
will be better if these questions are addressed first.
Ill. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The privatization of key industries throughout the world,
as economies shift from central planning and control to market
driven capital formation, has led to significant improvements
in financial regulation. This phenomenon is particularly appar-
ent in Europe, at the individual country level and at the level
of the European Union. 7 ° Privatization of retirement savings
will accelerate this trend.
Nevertheless, the world and international financial regula-
tors have a long way to go in providing investors with harmo-
nized disclosure and corporate governance standards and sec-
ondary market transparency. Further, economic turmoil over
the past year in Asia, Russia and other emerging markets have
demonstrated not only the risks that downdrafts in foreign
markets pose to U.S. financial institutions and investors, but
also the havoc that U.S. investors can cause abroad.' Inter-
national organizations do not exist to deal with these prob-
lems.
Better disclosure by corporate issuers has been addressed
by the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO"), but IOSCO is a voluntary organization of the
world's securities regulators with no ability to make its recom-
mendations mandatory." Harmonization of international ac-
counting standards has been progressing at the International
... EU securities regulation initiatives are described in an article by Manning
Gilbert Warren III. The European Union's Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 181 (1994).
' See Anita Raghavan & Matt Murray, Financial Firms Lose $8 Billion So
Far, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1998, at A2; Michael R. Sesit & Sara Webb, Wall
Street Takes The Globe on a Wild Ride, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1998, at C1.
172 See Roberta S. Karmel, National Treatment, Harmonization and Mutual Rec-
ognition 12 (Capital Markets Forum, Int'l Bar Ass'n, June 1993).
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Accounting Standards Committee ("IASC"), but it is unclear
whether such international standards will be accepted as au-
thoritative by the SEC for filed SEC documents or the extent
to which the IASC will compliment or supplant national ac-
counting standard setters in the United States and else-
where.173 The European Union has harmonized disclosure in
public offerings to some degree but has not moved forward on
harmonization of accounting or corporate governance. 74 Fur-
ther, although the European Central Bank will act as a finan-
cial regulator to some extent for countries in the European
monetary Union, no securities regulator along the lines of the
SEC has been established or contemplated. 75 Finally, while
the United Kingdom is in the process of completely
reregulating its financial markets through the establishment of
a new super-regulator for all financial institutions, it is unclear
how this new regulator will operate in London, let alone in
coordination with foreign regulators. 76 The Asian financial
crisis was triggered by a Japanese banking crisis caused by
speculation on the part of Japanese financial firms and poor
financial regulation.'77
In Europe, universal banking is the norm, and even U.S.
banks operating abroad follow this regime.7 ' Accordingly, the
primary and most effective international financial regulators
are the Basle Committee and the Bank for International -Set-
tlements.'79 The problem of developing a global response to
the supervision and regulation of financial conglomerates has
been addressed in a limited way by the Basle Committee and
IOSCO.' However, much more work needs to be done; tur-
173 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, UNDERSTANDING IAS xx-xiv (1996); FASB in 'Very
Good" State, Jenkins Says, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 251, 253-54
(Feb. 13, 1998).
114 See BENN STEIL, THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS 147-81, 304-07 (1996).
171 See id. at 134.
176 See Richard Miles, Giant Watchdog Will Take Time to Grow its Teeth, TIMES
(LONDON), Oct. 29, 1997, at 31; FSA Must Wait For Powers, TIMES (LONDON), June
1, 1998, at 48.
177 See Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Financial Mess, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 57 (1998);
Satoru Murase, Bankruptcy Attorney: Modern Day Samurai, NATL L.J., Sept. 14,
1998, at Cl.; Alan Reynolds, Japan Should Cut Taxes to Spur Investment, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 11, 1998, at A14; Jathon Sapsford, Japan's Plan for Banks Sinks
Deeper In Debate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1998, at A12.
178 See Fisher, supra note 157, at 136-41.
179 See GAO, RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 87, at 8-9.
" See Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalization of Financial
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moil in the financial markets has made this an urgent task.
Prompted by the Asian crisis, the Bank for International Set-
tlements determined to establish an advisory body to help
governments draw up policies aimed at ensuring stability in
their financial systems. 181 Further, repercussions from this
financial crisis suggest that more widespread public support
for dealing with instability in international financial markets
and institutions may be forthcoming.'82
The lack of harmonized standards for accounting, disclo-
sure and corporate governance, the precarious condition of
many foreign banks and financial institutions and the volatili-
ty in the international securities markets pose important is-
sues to those who contemplate privatization of Social Security.
Today, private pension plans are free to invest abroad and they
do so.'" If Social Security is privatized, will personal invest-
ment accounts be permitted such freedom? Such investments
may increase returns, but it will also increase risks for these
accounts, especially in view of the lack of transparency and
liquidity in many foreign markets.
CONCLUSION
This Article has speculated about some of the regulatory
reforms that might accompany or follow Social Security privat-
ization, especially if such privatization takes a form that per-
mits individuals to choose their own investments in a private
investment account similar to current defined contribution
plans. The SEC already is gearing up for more aggressive
regulation. In a recent speech concerning Social Security pri-
vatization, the SEC Chairman stated that if such privatization
Risks and International Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from
the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L LAW. 301 (1996); George A. Walker, The Law of
Financial Conglomerates: The Next Generation, 30 INT'L LAW. 57, 71-72 (1996).
"8 See BIS, Basle Group Set Up International Financial Stability Body, 70
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 450 (Mar. 16, 1998).
" See Trade Union Advisory Committee Calls for Commission for Financial
Market Regulation, 70 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 738 (May 4, 1998).
'" Between one-quarter and one-half of defined benefit plans and about 5% of
defined benefit plans invest more than 15% of their assets in international assets,
and only about 13% of either type of plan shuns foreign holdings entirely. See
Globe-trotting, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1, 1998, at 181.
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leads to self-directed individual accounts, "we must be ready to
undertake an unprecedented level of broad-scale policing of the
equity markets.""
The purpose of the Article has been to raise issues and
provoke discussion rather than to argue for or against any
particular form of Social Security privatization or any particu-
lar regulatory reform. Time and space constraints have made it
necessary to paint an extremely complicated subject with a
broad brush.
Yet, this Author's premise has been that Social Security
privatization would be such a drastic economic and political
change, that it could not take place in a vacuum. The govern-
ment is inevitably the provider of last resort to those who
cannot provide for themselves. Older citizens without resources
will not be put out on the street to starve. Therefore, the gov-
ernment will have to ensure that Social Security funds invest-
ed otherwise than in government bonds is invested in honest
businesses and not exposed to undue risk. This is a tricky
business because too much government interference in the
capital formation process would change the nature of capital-
ism.185
Further, if Social Security funds are invested in the public
securities markets, whether by individual selection or in a con-
strained mode, there will have to be some assurance that the
intermediaries involved are financially sound and that the
funds are protected in the event of intermediary insolvency.
Regulatory mechanisms to this effect are already in place to-
day, but they are inconsistent as applied to different types of
financial intermediaries. Moreover, if billions of new funds are
channeled into the equity markets, this will have an impact on
the markets and on financial intermediaries that is difficult to
accurately predict. This Author's judgement is that the mar-
kets will become more institutionalized and more volatile and
this will subject retirement savings to new risks that will have
to be controlled in some way.
' SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, The SEC Perspective on Investing Social Secu-
rity in the Stock Market, Address at the John F. Kennedy School of Government
Forum 3 (Oct. 19, 1998) (transcript available at <http-J/www.sec.gov/news/
speeches/spch223.htm>).
1. See id. at 5.
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Since the prospect of Social Security privatization is under
discussion not only in the United States, but in many other
countries, the problem of how to adjust financial regulation to
accommodate such privatization is an international one. Fur-
ther, unless Social Security funds are restricted against cross-
border investment, regulatory inadequacies abroad will be felt
in the United States.

